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In this thesis, we aim to find the relationship between the economic crisis and the rise 
of nationalism in Yugoslavia. In addition, we focus on the political framework, as 
defined by the 1974 Constitution, which significantly changed the course of Yugoslav 
institutions after the death of Tito. We find that the rising levels of debt and economic 
misbalance across republics were key contributors to increasing tensions between 
republics. We conclude that the combination of these factors with the lack of political 
will, stemming from decentralization and increased power to republics, as the main 
culprits behind the rise of nationalism. We build on the existing literature, 
contributing to the further cross-examination of reasons behind the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. The importance of this thesis is related to the political elite, who can 
apply key takeaways from the case of Yugoslavia to the modern geopolitical context 
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The Rise of Nationalism in Times of Crisis - The Case of Yugoslavia 
  
TOPIC CARACTERISTICS 
Throughout the 20th century, nationalism played a key role as a cohesive factor in 
times of crisis and war. In times of crises, the political elite and advising policy 
makers often struggle in proposing effective solutions that can result in a positive 
impact. The political elite used all available methods to stay in power, including the 
use of nationalistic rhetoric to mobilize consensus and gain the support of the people 
that were searching for a sense of belonging. Policy makers stunned by a crisis, with 
a lack of vision for the future and ideas for solving the problems at hand, often have 
no courage to initiate and implement radical reforms. Instead, they propagate 
“otherness”, believing that they could easily attract support from discouraged citizens 
while also keeping things under control. The Yugoslav experience in the 80s of the 




1) Socialist bankruptcy is a main trigger behind the eventual rise in nationalism 
 
2) Deterioration of the economic system resulted in the rise of nationalism  
 
3) The political elite took advantage of the political framework and decentralization, which 





In this study we will apply quantitative and qualitative methods. To prove first 
hypothesis we will be using the approach based on the evolution of the institutional 
system, following the "DECIDE" framework, as defined by McGinnis (2003). The 
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best methodology can be based on social institutionalism, which is further supported 
by elementary findings on political economy. Both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches with basic statistical data will be the foundation of proving our 
hypotheses. Though, as the main focus of the research is rise of nationalism 
stemming from political reactions to the economic crisis, the second and third 
hypotheses will be approached from a qualitative angle, due to the assumed value of 
the context and setting. Political reactions to the crisis will be based on the political 






    1.1. Literature review 
    1.2. Researched methodology 
2. Theoretical background 
3.Social economic events leading up to separation of Yugoslavia 
    3.1. Underlying economic foundations: economic differences between republics 
    3.2. Socialist unemployment 
    3.2. Yugoslav fiscal system and institutional ineffectiveness 
4. Yugoslav crisis after Tito's death  
    4.1. Triggers of the Yugoslav economic crisis and political gridlock 
    4.1. Political reaction to the crisis and increase of nationalism 
    4.2. Political elite and Split within Communist Party  




Banchini, S. (2011). The Resurgence of Nationalism in times of Crisis. The Yugoslav 
Collapse, the EU uncertain future, and the prospect of reconciliation in the Balkans. 
Bologna University 
  Begic. K. (1989). Jugoslovenski sjever i jug: medjurepublicka finansijska 
solidarnost. Oslobodjenje. Sarajevno 
Bennet. C. (1997). Yugoslav bloody collapse; Causes, Course and Consequences. 
NYU Press. 
Bogoev, K. (1991). The Dangers of Decentralization. Experience of Yugoslavia. U: 
Rémy Prud'homme, ur., Public Finance with Several Levels of Government. 
Haag/Koenigstein: Foundation Journal Public: 99-112. 
Borak, N. (2000). "Economic Background to National Conflicts in Yugoslavia". 
Cambridge University Press. 312-313. 
Crnobrnja, M (1996). The Yugoslav Drama. Second edition. I.B. Taurus, Publishers. 
London. New York  
Djerdj, S. (2003). Ekonomske reforme u Jugoslaviji-jedno vidjenje spolja.  
Gligorov, V. (1990). Privredna federacija ili konfederacija. Politicka misao, 15-21. 
9 
 
Gligorov, V. (1993). Why do Countries Break Up? The case of Yugoslavia. 
Department of Soviet and East European Studies. Uppsala University. Uppsala. 
Goati, Vladimir (1989), Politicka anatomija jugoslovenskog drustva, Naprijed, 
Zagreb. 
Goati, V. (1996). Politicke elite, gradjanski rat i raspad SFRY. Republica & Yurope. 
http://www.yurope.com/zines/republika/arhiva/96/147/147-17.html 
Goati, V. (1997). The designation of Yugoslavia. The role of political elites. 
Hejden, M. (2011). EU-slavija zajednicka klica raspada.  Vreme. Serbia. 
http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=1020021 
Horvat, B. (1985). Jugoslavensko društvo u krizi. Globus, Zagreb. 
Jovic, D. (2003). Jugoslavija-drzava koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad cetvrte 
Jugoslavije. Promej, Zagreb. 
Korošić, M. (1989). Jugoslavenska Kriza. Naprijed. Zagreb. 
Kresic, A. (1994). Zasto je Jugoslavija dvaput propadala. in: Raspad Jugoslavije. 
Institut za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju. Beograd. 
Kupchan, Ch. (1995). Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe. Cornell 
University Press. Ithaca, New York. 
Labus, M. (1994). Uloga ekonomije u raspadu Jugoslavije. Faculty of Law. Belgrade. 
Lampe, J. (2000). Yugoslavia as History; Twice there was a Country. Cambridge 
University Press 
Linz, J. & Stepan, A. (1992). Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Deddalus.  
Petak, Z. (2005). Ekonomska pozadina raspada Socijalisticke Jugoslavije.  
Sörensen, J. (2009). State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery; Political 
economy, ethnicity and development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo. Berghahn 
Books. New York. 
Spencer, M. (1998). Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration. Publisher: Rowman 
& Littlefield 
Stankovic-Pejnović, V. (2010). Raspad Jugoslavije, politicke elite, nacionalizam. 















MASTER THESIS PROPOSAL............................................................................... 7 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................. 11 
  
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................  12  
 
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 13 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW................................................................................. 18 
  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....................................................................  25 
 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK................................................................... 27 
 
4.1. Theories of nationalism- primordialism vs. modernism ............................... 27  
4.1.1. Top-down perspective................................................................................ 29 
4.2. The connection between democracy and nationalism................................... 30 
4.3. Nationalism as an argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia....................  32 
 
5. SOCIO ECONOMIC EVENTS LEADING UP TO SEPERATION 
 OF YUGOSLAVIA .........................................................................................  36 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
5.1. Underlying economic foundations: economic differences between republics 
5.2. Socialist unemployment................................................................................. 39 
5.3. Yugoslav fiscal system and institutional ineffectiveness.............................. 41 
 
6. THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL GRIDLOCK  
  
6.1. Triggers of the Yugoslav economic crisis.................................................... 48 
6.2. Political reactions to the crisis and increase of nationalism......................... 49 
6.3. Political elite and the split within Communist party.................................... 59 
 
7. CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 65  
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................... 69  
 






LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
 
SFRY         Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
IMF            International Monetary Fond 
WB             World Bank 
GDP            Gross domestic product 
OAPEC       Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
JNA             Yugoslav Federal Army 
CPY             Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
















LIST OF FIGURES 
Map 1: SFRY before the war 1990..............................................................................75 
Figure 1: Structure of GDP in republics and provinces 1952-1989............................76 
Table 1: Unemployment rate in Yugoslav federal units..............................................77 
Table 2: Portion of total public expenditure based on level of government, 




















Throughout the 20th century, nationalism played a key role as a cohesive 
factor in times of crisis and war. This was true during the First and Second World 
Wars, just as it was at the end of the century, which saw the rise of nationalism, 
increased ethnic tensions and the eventual dissolution of the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia. But is nationalism a result of a natural belonging to a 
collective or is it a result of external factors? Can increased economic disparities 
between regions or political models that are not based on foundations of tolerance 
and mutual understanding be factors that impact this trend?  
In times of crises, the political elite and advising policy makers often struggle 
in proposing effective solutions that can result in a positive impact. As was the case 
in Yugoslavia, the political elite used all available methods to stay in power, 
including the use of nationalistic rhetoric to mobilize consensus and gain the support 
of the people that were searching for a sense of belonging (Bianchini, 2011).  
This all contributes in reinforcing the identification of "otherness" as a social 
factor of a group's threat, resulting in ethnic and social tensions. Therefore, we have a 
situation where everybody is unsatisfied and looking for the guilty party. When 
people are not satisfied with themselves and the situation they are in, they cling onto 
those type of ideas that awake the human within which are usually related to national 
and religious ties. Suddenly, they feel empowered when they are told that they are not 
the ones at fault, but that “those other people are to blame”.  
Policy makers stunned by a crisis, with a lack of vision for the future and 
ideas for solving the problems at hand, often have no courage to initiate and 
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implement radical reforms. Instead, they propagate “otherness”, believing that they 
could easily attract support from discouraged citizens while also keeping things under 
control. This was commonplace in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, as nationalist rhetoric 
increased significantly, without any concrete solutions proposed or any aggressive 
structural reforms seen through.   
The breakup of the former Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Map 1) and following conflicts were a significant challenge for international 
politicians and diplomats. The ideological war between the east and west, ending with 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, left Yugoslavia standing proud as the founder of the non-
aligned nations. Yugoslavia was seen as a "moral winner". In 1991, however, the 
world was shocked by the events that were happening in Yugoslavia when the ethnic 
war started in a country that was made of six different nations who had lived under an 
authoritative system, in peace and solidarity for over 45 years. The death of Tito in 
1980, coupled with mounting debt, resulted in deteriorating living conditions 
throughout the republics. Imperative political reforms were not carried out, ethnic 
tensions grew and the conflict became inevitable.  
Since then, many authors have been trying to explain the causes of the bloody 
war, many arguments including: economic climate, nationalism, ethnic hatred, 
international (external) factors, cultural differences, etc. Most claimed that 
nationalism was the starting point of the breakup of the country that was once a stable 
and relatively prosperous socialist federation. Robert Hayden provided interesting 
insight into the split of the former Yugoslavia. Namely, he notices that there was a 
void left after the collapse of the communist party. He believed this void was filled 
15 
 
with nationalist sentiment. He continued, arguing that citizens of a country must 
identify with each other in terms of ethnicity. Without this unity, a nation cannot be 
stable and those belonging to a group will always wish to be together (Hayden, 1998). 
These ethnic tensions are not exclusive to the former Yugoslavia, but can be seen 
throughout the world even today, for example of Kurds in Syria and Iraq. The former 
Yugoslav republics were able to live in unity until the authoritative figures, i.e. the 
communist party, fell apart. 
The problem with this line of argumentation is that it disregards the role of the 
political elite in response to the economic crisis and the political framework which 
prevented further reforms necessary for the continued functioning of the federation. 
 In line with above, we aim to answer following questions:  
a) Did the country fall apart due to the increased stress resulting from socialist 
bankruptcy? How reluctant were the republics to share the costs of socialist 
bankruptcy and how did this impact the end result - dissolution? 
b) Were the financial and economic crises triggers for the reinforcement of 
nationalism? 
c) Did the political elite of Yugoslav republics take advantage of the political 
framework and inability to reform the political system in order to preserve 
power and promote the interests of their respective republics? Did the 
protection of their republic's interests result in economic nationalism, further 




 Consequently, in attempting to answer these questions, it poses the following 
hypotheses to test and explain: 
1. Socialist bankruptcy is a main trigger behind the eventual rise in nationalism 
2. Rise of nationalism stems from economic crisis 
3. Insufficient reforms by the political elite lead to the split within the 
communist party, increasing nationalism 
 The research questions outlined above imply that the objective of this thesis 
aims to examine the  reinforcement of nationalism in time of crisis. The study 
prioritizes the impact of the economic and political systems on the rise of nationalism 
throughout the Yugoslav republics.  
 This study is divided in the following way: chapter two describes the literature 
review related to the economic crisis in Yugoslavia, political frameworks, and role of 
political elites sparking the rise of nationalism. Chapter three focuses on the 
methodology used throughout this study. Chapter four will develop theoretical 
background for our study, considering two main academic approaches to nationalism 
which are applicable to our study. The first is the modernist school (economic 
approach), which is centered around economic development. The second is the 
primordialists school (ethnic approach), which is centered around the ethnic 
approach. Following, we will consider the connection between democracy and 
nationalism. Chapter five will describe socio economic events leading up to 
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separation of Yugoslavia. Chapter six will describe political rejection thought the 
crisis, followed by the concluding statements.  
 The effect of the economic crisis on the breakup of Yugoslavia has been 
studied in previous works. Our aim, however, is to focus on the aspect of nationalism 
- connecting the economic crisis and the political framework with the rise of 
nationalism throughout republics. We will not focus on the individuals involved in 
the wars or try to find the main culprit behind what happened in the 1990s.  
 The importance of studying the events that lead to the death of Yugoslavia is 
significant in the modern geopolitical context and can be applied to the European 
Union. Namely, the recent global economic crisis has had profound effects on 
Europe, particularly related to the bailout of Greece, as well as public debt issues in 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Similarly, the influx of refugees from the Middle East 
and Africa has challenged the political framework which the Union applies. The 
political elite in Europe must be aware of the events that occurred in Yugoslavia that 
were triggered by the economic crisis in 1970 and the political framework adopted 
after the death of Tito. As nationalistic and protectionist rhetoric rises in France and 
Switzerland, studying the case of Yugoslavia may prove significant in resolving 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Thousands of scholars have written about the dissolution of the Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, offering a wide array of reasons. The most 
common explanation of the events leading up to the civil war that took place between 
1991-1995 include ethnic tensions and intolerance. Ivekovic (2000), Bianchini 
(1998), Connor (1994) and Schopflin (1998) are among the many scholars that 
described notions such as “ethnic nationalism” or “ethno-nationalism”, which became 
the principal way for understanding Yugoslav dissolution. Some authors believe that 
nationalism, stemming from the end of the Second World War, was the starting point 
of the breakup of the country that was once stable and relatively prosperous socialist 
federation that would eventually be split into ethnically divided republics by the 
beginning of the 90s. Similarly, Kaplan (1994) claims that nations in the region are 
guided by historical standing intolerance. The more frequent reasoning arises from 
the interpretation of the newly adopted constitution of 1974, which significantly 
changed the political landscape within the country and set the foundation for 
governance after the death of Tito (Petak, 2005). Others relate the dissolution of the 
country to the worsening global landscape at the time, with other eastern European 
countries rejecting the communist regimes and adopting a western oriented political 
model. Multiple factors have played a role, however many believe that the root cause 
was in fact nationalism. But, the cause of the rise in nationalism at the end of the 20th 
century is not fully explored, as some scholars point out that they are a product of 
economic, legal, and political gridlock. We will explore these underlying problems 
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that are the root cause of dissolution in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
rise in nationalism that lead to the eventual separation of Yugoslavia.   
 Some of the most important literature which examined the economic 
differences between regions and economic problems as the source of national 
identity, including the case of Yugoslavia, was written by scholars such as Alice 
Teichova, Herbert Matis and Jaroslav Patek (2000). In their work, entitled "Economic 
Change and the National Question in Twentieth-Century Europe", they cooperated 
with a Slovenian historian, Novak Borak, who claimed that the former Yugoslavia 
was an economic federation with the highest degree of internal economic differences 
in Europe. He compared the standard of living and GDP of individual republics with 
that of other nations. "Yugoslavia was at the level of Turkey in terms of per capita 
gross domestic product at purchasing power parity in 1985. Kosovo, the less-
developed part of Yugoslavia, was at the same  level as Pakistan. The most developed 
part, Slovenia, was compared with Spain and New Zealand. Vojvodina and Croatia 
approached Greece and Portugal. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were 
compared with Thailand and Mexico, and Serbia with Turkey (Borak, 2000. pp. 312-
313)". 
 The second author that also dealt with the economic differences between 
republics/regions in Yugoslavia was Plestina (1992). According to her, the reasons 
behind the split of Yugoslavia was a result of regional economic differences 
throughout the country. In examining her hypothesis, she split the country into two 
regions: the northern part being economically developed (Slovenia, Croatia, northern 
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Serbia and Vojvodina) and the southern part (Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the province of Kosovo). The conflict is a result of republics feeling 
exploited by the economic system. That is to say, the north believe that the poor 
republics in the south were responsible for slow economic development which the 
south complained that the north is not helping them enough and that it is exploiting 
trade for their own gain. The conclusion drawn from Plestina's work is that there was 
a lack of social cohesion among republics and that economic solidarity was not strong 
enough to promote the balancing of the standard of living throughout the country.  
 Dimitar Mirchev (2006) also agreed that lack of solidarity resulted in the 
collapse of Yugoslavia. He compared the state of Yugoslavia with that of the 
European Union, arguing that there was an unequal standard of living across the 
territory: one that was less developed (south of Yugoslavia/ Eastern Europe) and one 
that was more developed (north of Yugoslavia/ Western Europe). He confirmed that 
the greatest challenge in both cases was finding common ground and solidarity, only 
then could the standard of living be increased and the economic situation improved. 
 Susan Woodward (1995) in her book "Socialistic Unemployment" agrees with 
previous authors that economic differences between the republics/regions were the 
reason for Yugoslav dissolution. However, she went further and focused much of her 
efforts on socialist unemployment. She concluded that Yugoslavia could have 
survived while it ensured socialist employment. However, after Tito's death and 
decentralization of the economy took effect, she believed that the root cause of 
dissolution was the social aspect fueled by increased unemployment in the southeast 
21 
 
and eastern parts of the country. Decentralization lead to the key stakeholders 
focusing on the interests of their own republics as opposed to that of Yugoslavia as a 
whole. She therefore concluded that the main reason leading to increased nationalism 
within republics was unemployment and decentralization, leading to the 
disintegration of the federation.  
 Similarly, Petak (2003) built on the theories developed by Woodward, 
explaining that the bankruptcy of socialism, due to high unemployment, 
decentralization and significant differences in the standard of living between 
republics/regions, lead to economic nationalism. Finally, the Slovenes and Croats 
changed course, aiming for a Western European model, while the Serbs and 
Montenegrins were grounded in their communist beliefs. Each of the republics was 
focused on their national interests above those of Yugoslavia.  
 Dejan Jovic (2003) believed that the deep economic crisis resulted in the fall 
of the communist regime because it increased the disparities and feeling of injustice 
throughout the republics. Given that the alternative to socialism was not accepted (or 
was not possible at the time), the idea of equality and justice was found amount 
citizens within the republics, which thereby lead to the rise in nationalism.  
 Miroljub Labus (1994) blames the economic system which was a result of "an 
unequal division of funds, which lead to inherited economic problems becoming deep 
social problems" eventually leading to increased ethnic tensions and the collapse of 
the federation. The country's economic system was not prepared to deal with the 
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deepening debt crisis and was unwilling to see through the necessary reforms. 
Similarly, the misallocation of funds throughout the nation and poor economic 
planning lead to deeper differences in the standard of living across republics, finally 
leading to national conflicts. 
 In addition to analyzing the existing literature related to the economic factors 
which had an impact on the rise in nationalism throughout the republics, we will also 
consider the political structure and legal framework which was established in 
Yugoslavia at the time. The role of the political elite in the rise of nationalism will be 
considered as well.  
 Ramet (2006) argues that the illegitimate political system impacted the 
fractioning of the federation. She claimed that the illegitimate system was based on 
the decisions of the ruling communist party. Control and surveillance of the media 
further illegitimated the system  as it suppressed the reality of the situation. Given the 
context of the federal system and six republics which were gaining power, the 
discontent would eventually pour through these channels of communication. 
Considering this view, we conclude that the illegitimate system was one of the main 
contributors to the death of Yugoslavia. Considering the other democratic changes 
that were happening throughout the world at the time, most importantly in the 
countries that were under the iron curtain, had free elections for the parliament been 
held at the federal level, the outcome might have been different. Unfortunately, this 
did not come to fruition due to the Serbian-Slovenian opposition.  
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 Bianchini (2011) claimed that economic crisis was reason for dissolution, but 
he goes even further blaming republics leaders for rise of nationalism. He claimed 
that political leaders were focused on the internal interests of the republic, which 
thereby enabled them to solidify their position of power. This resulted in 
protectionism of the interests of the republic in the form of nationalism. 
 Goati (1996) claimed that the blossoming of nationalism was a result of the 
economic crisis, and that the political elite was unsuccessful in carrying out the 
necessary structural political reforms that would prevent the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.  
 Bianchini (2011) highlighted that this trend became more and more prevalent 
as tensions between republics increased. It resulted in a reduced trade and increased 
social inequality. The gap between developed and undeveloped regions increased, 
spurring the rising support of nationalism throughout all republics.  
 Stankovic-Pejnovic (2005) claimed that political elite follows the ideology of 
the collective, and must replace it with a similar collective ideology upon change. 
That is to say, they must adopt a nationalistic ideology.  
 Spencer and Bacher (2001), claimed that "ethno-nationalism was almost 
tailor-made to replace the old ideological schema." Political stakeholders in all 
republics made use of the opportunity to advocate their story to a political base that 
further lead to increased ethnic tensions.  
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 Malcolm (1994) wrote that the underlying reasoning behind ethnic conflicts is 
due to the manipulation of political elites instead of some inherent genetic 
predisposition toward the ethnic animosities of the peoples of the region.  
 Some authors argue that nationalism does not appear on its own. Rather, it is a 
result of political manipulation further promoted by key political stakeholders in 
order to gain their own interests. 
 Spencer and Bacher (2001) further claimed that people who know of one 
collectivist ideology (communism) and that are deprived of an enemy, tend to find it 
difficult to adjust to a democratic system based on pluralism and tolerance. Instead, 
they seek a new outlet through which they can blame others for their problems. 
 Goati (1997) found that the elite, while fighting their battle regarding political 
reforms (monism and pluralism) and the structure of the future country 
(federation/confederation), were further mobilizing the citizens from their regions 
which lead to increased political conflict among the various ethnicities in the country.  
 Crnobrnja (1996) developed a similar thesis claiming that the reluctance to 
carry out political reforms resulted in the opening of Pandora's box of ethnic tensions 
instead of developing reforms which could give the people a role of significance. He 
wrote "Rather blaming systematic causes for pure economic performance, because 
that would have involved self-criticism as well, the popular line became that others 




3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 This thesis is a case study by its very nature. It aims to examine the rise of 
nationalism due to economic instability and due to the political framework which 
impacted the decision making by key stakeholders in the former Yugoslavia. That is 
to say, an additional analysis regarding the political structure and failed reforms will 
be investigated in order to better understand the framework which lead to the 
strengthening of nationalistic parties in the republics and the eventual death of 
Yugoslavia. To do so we will firstly try to answer the question why "traditional 
nationalism" that quickly distorted social and political frameworks that held the 
Yugoslav federation together for decades using two approaches. The first approach is 
related to the  legitimacy of the political elite which was established by the 1974 
Constitution. The second approach investigates the unwillingness of republics to 
share the cost of socialist bankruptcy. In the third chapter we will focus on the second 
approach, explaining that the dissolution of Yugoslavia is result of socialist 
bankruptcy. Moreover, showing that the economic dimension of dissolution is 
associated with the rise of economic and ethnic nationalism.  
 To prove why traditional nationalism quickly destroyed social and political 
frameworks that held the Yugoslav Federation together, we will be using the 
approach based on the evolution of the institutional system, following the "DECIDE" 
framework, as defined by McGinnis (2003). The best methodology can be based on 
social institutionalism, which is further supported by elementary findings on political 
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economy. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches with basic statistical data will 
be the foundation of proving our first hypotheses.  
 Though, as the main focus of the research is rise of nationalism stemming 
from political reactions to the economic crisis, the second and third hypotheses will 
be approached from a qualitative angle, due to the assumed value of the context and 
setting. Political reactions to the crisis will be based on the political context in the 
given period.  
 In order to carry out this analysis, we will be using multiple sources by the 
most influential scholars in this field. In the construction of the theoretical 
framework, we will depend on prominent academics in the field of international 
relations and theories of nationalism and its connection with political power, 
complimenting similar works on economics and politics in Yugoslavia. Most of 
primary and secondary socio-economic data are obtained by books of various authors, 
as well as The International Monetary Fund and World Bank reports. In the literature 
review above, we have cited the key scholars we referred to. Their publications are 
complemented by tertiary sources, such as: journal articles, newspaper articles, 
reports and documents related to the study of nationalism, economy and political 






4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
4.1. Theories of nationalism - primordialism vs. modernism 
 In order to gain a deeper understanding of the complex relationship between 
political reactions to the crisis and rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia, this thesis builds 
upon the theoretical concept of nationalism and its connection to democracy.  
 In line with Calhoun's (1993) observation the term nationalism was coined 
by German philosopher Herder just less than two hundred years ago, who claimed 
that every nation must be able to highlight their uniqueness through language and 
culture within their separate state. It was linked to the concept of nation-state in the 
formulations of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations (Maya 1990, Kahn 
1962). As communism collapsed, Eastern European politics and identity were 
characterised by nationalism and ethnic conflict (Chirot, Tilly & Walker 1991).  
 Definition and nature of nationalism remains the subject of debate. It takes 
different forms in different societies, and it is a highly complex phenomenon (Smith, 
1998). In a line with Beland's and Lacorus's observation authors of primordialists 
school of thoughts believe that nationalism involves two elements: 1) Identity derived 
from religion, language, ethnicity (whether it is real or created), sharing a common 
market, etc. Therefore, one could conclude that nationalism takes shape of “identity 
politics”, which brings about an emotional characteristic of its manifestation  (Smith, 
1998, pp. 146-199). 2) Also, nationalism delivers a process of division at territorial 
levels, in order to obtain or retain self-governance of a group or a nation (in the form 
of autonomy or independence). It is a process of territorial mobilization (Brass, 
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1991). Hence, nationalism is a form of politics, which may be characterized by 
identity formation. It cannot be separated from the exercise of political power 
(Beland & Lecorus 2005). 
 According to Smith (1993) nationalism is a modern phenomenon, yet he 
emphases ‘ethnic origins’ of modern nations. Smith sees civil/territorial nationalism 
as founded in shared culture, common laws and territorial citizenship. Membership of 
the nation is defined by civic nationalism whereby residence participate politically in 
public culture. He sees ethnic nationalism as an ethnic conception of the nation that 
‘focuses on the genealogy of its members, however fictive, on popular mobilization 
of  “the folk”; on native history and customs and on the vernacular culture” (Smith, 
1993). In both types of nationalism conflicts emerge because people identify with 
their nation. 
 However, authors of modernist school of thought Anderson (1998), Gellner 
(1993) and Hobsbawm (1993) find the nation as an ‘imagined political community". 
Each  ethnic group is  part of a social group for some historical period, which will not 
exist forever. According to them, political principles have a goal to unite political and 
national unities, with their bureaucratic and legal institutions using their shared 
language (Gellner, 1983, p. 57) . 
 There are two very similar but differing views on what is required to deliver 
functional political institutions. The political theorists like Lijphart (1977), and 
Scharpf (1999), claim that demos needs to coincide with ethnos. Liberal nationalists 
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are also following the same reasoning Miller (1995) & Hopkins (2001), Moore 
(2001) & Young (1990). The difference between the two perspectives remains in that 
the latter focuses on equality in a plural society. Their reasoning is based on the 
assumption that effectiveness of institutions is dependent on the collective culture. 
The two approaches also agree that nations need to be homogenous to a certain 
degree to hold people together. Political stability is proportional to the level of 
homogeneity (Salins, 1997). 
 Smith (1998) observes that despite difficulties in agreeing on the content and 
composition of nationalism, majority of scholars concur that historical experiences 
are deeply rooted in forming identity of social groups and have over time become a 
form of attachment. 
4.1.1. Top-down perspective 
 Authors such as Gellner (1983) representative of modernists school of thought 
claims explicitly that nationalism is created by political elite. His colleagues 
Anderson (1983) and Deutsch (1996) specified further to say that nationalism is 
created by political elite. (Anderson, 1983; Deutsch, 1966).  According to them, 
modern (industrialized) society is a catalyst of values that are created around  a 
common language and culture that pushes for development of bureaucratic system 
that could facilitate the creation of common political arena and public mass 
education. Consequently, civil society is shaped by the institutionalized nationalism 
driven by political elites. Authors of  primordialists school of thoughts Smith (1998) 
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and Breuilly (2002) do not deny that elite create nationalism, but they believe that 
they are not the only responsible for the development for nationalism. According to 
them, political elites use nationalism to unify their positions as well as for mobilizing 
political actions.  
 In line with Whitmeyer's (2002) observation rational choice perspective says 
that individuals tend to pursue their interests and therefore believe that nationalism is 
not created by elites (Díez Medrano, 1995). However, some authors such as 
Rogowski (1985) believe that under certain circumstances elites lead non elites into 
nationalism. 
 Brass (1991) furthermore claims that elites manipulate symbols of ethnicity in 
order to create ethnic identity based on interests of the elite. This process of public 
display of symbols and standpoint is prevalent in all modern societies, but varies 
significantly across different entities in strength and shape. According to Snyder and 
Bellentine (1996) the way nationalism is articulated differs from being extreme (as in 
states in war) to being more of a battle of ideas in more pacified states (Whitmeyer, 
2002).   
Theories and views differ about nationalism, yet they share a common feature: 
emphasis on the role of the elite in its creation and shape.  
4.2. The Connection between Democracy and Nationalism  
 In line with Spencer's (2001) observation, the advantages of adopting a 
democratic system in developing countries comes with negatives as well. In the 
31 
 
1980s and 1990s, when many countries of the eastern bloc started transitioning 
towards democracy, there had been a rise of ethnic nationalist movements throughout 
the world. The reasons may be related to the increased acceptance of people sharing 
their opinion that may have been suppressed during the dictatorial rule. Citizens 
therefore become involved with their ethnic identity at the same time of democratic 
liberalization takes effect. 
 Many scholars argue that nationalism is not a spontaneous movement. When 
nationalism becomes a part of political discourse, it is always a result of politicians 
that use it as a tool to manipulate the people and gain their support. That said, they 
would be unsuccessful in introducing nationalism if the people are not intrigued by it  
(Spencer, 2001). In line with Whitmeyer (2002) observation authors like Brass 
(1991), Breuilly (1993), Ignatieff (1993) and Snyder (2000) founded, political elites 
often used nationalistic rhetoric in order to achieve their political goals. It is not 
uncommon for these political movements to be closely related to separation, 
autonomy or for further promoting the rights of their ethnic group. 
 Once people who have lived under communism start transitioning toward a 
democratic system, they tend to find it difficult to accept a new political system 
which is based on mutual understanding and tolerance. Instead, it often occurs that 
people start looking for someone to blame for their problems. As Puhovski wrote, 
"ethno nationalism was almost tailor-made to replace the old ideological schema". As 
was the case, the leaders of republics took advantage of the situation in order to 
promote their political agenda using nationalist rhetoric. This was seen in other case 
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outside of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union being the closest example at the time. In the 
transition towards democracy, these leaders position themselves as "dictators" using 
the instruments of democracy (Spencer, 2001).  
 The result in this transition towards democracy is the increased opportunity 
for nationalism and separatism from ethnic groups. This was the case in Western 
countries as well, including Canada (Quebec), UK (Scotland) and Belgium. Most 
often, these issues are resolved peacefully, but as was the case with Yugoslavia in the 
beginning of 90s, it can also end up in a bloody war.  
4.3. Nationalism as an argument for the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
 According to Cannon (1992) in order to explain nationalism, scholars use two 
terms: nationalism and ethno-nationalism. Furthermore, Kohn (1994) is making 
difference between two types of nationalism: Western European (that is closer to 
political term) and Eastern European (that is closer to cultural nation). Similarly, 
according to Hutchinson (1994) Western European nationalism promotes autonomy 
with equality for all citizens, while nationalism in Eastern Europe defines nation as a 
cultural and historical individuality that needs to be preserved and "revived" 
(Pejnovic, 2010). 
 In line with above division Arendt (1951) stated that Western European 
nationalism  correspond to  chauvinism, while the concept of tribal nationalism 




 According to Pejnovic (2010) nationalism and ethnic nationalism primarily 
differ in relation to the individual, on the one hand and the nation or the state, on the 
other hand. Nationalism seeks to limit the power of government and ensure civil 
rights, individual freedom and autonomy. On the contrary, ethnic nationalism puts the 
nation above the interests and rights of the individual. While, nationalism seeks to 
establish dignity and happiness for individual, for ethnic nationalism power of the 
nation is the most important. Nationalism aims to establish harmony and brotherhood 
among countrymen, while ethnic nationalism admires the force, and leads to conflict 
between ethno-national groups. 
 Many scholars who dealt with nationalism in Yugoslavia claimed that 
nationalism was strong and it had two forms: separatist on one side and  on the other 
side unitarians (Moore, 1998). While advocates of separatism insisted on creation of 
new countries within Yugoslavia, unitarians insisted on creation of Yugoslav nation 
and Yugoslavia as a nation state. Watchel (1998) believes that when we look at 
Yugoslav history, we should look at history of separatist and unitarians conflicts. 
According to Watchel it was a conflict over definition of nation and state. The main 
national issue was existence of one Yugoslav nation, or more nations within 
Yugoslavia. Since both types of nationalism were considered as anti-socialist 
ideologies, political elites were trying to suppress and discourage nationalism in the 
country. While they succeeded in this mission in the public sphere, in private sphere 
nationalism was present, especially among lower social strata .  
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 Socialism is against nationalism as it is a threat to nation states. In the late 
1980s the main conflict in Yugoslavia took place over the changes in the 1974 
Constitution. There were two opponents, on one side the so called 
"constitutionalists", who were against new changes and on the other side the 
constitution reformers advocating changes that would lead to the creation of 
Yugoslav nation. According to Banac (1984) national issues are derived from unequal 
political structures and diverging goals of different national ideologies that emerged 
within the political culture of each ethnic group. Reforms in the 1970s contributed to 
the development and strength of bureaucracy, opening the way to political opposition, 
creating old coalition between the working class and the political bureaucracy 
(Mayor, 1983). Bureaucracy took advantage over transformed "self-management" 
system without great vision of internationalism, populist democracy and economic 
and technological confidence. Bureaucracy obtained local power through 
constitutional amendments that provided high degree of political and economic 
autonomy to the Yugoslav republics. Economic fragmentation led to an open rivalry 
between competing local elites mobilized around national symbols (Ocić 1983). In 
such a situation, when all is uncertain and there is no hope for a better future, identity 
based on ethnicity/nation seem to be the safe harbor for those affected, as they 
experienced discontent and fear (Pejnovic 2010).  
 According to Mosse (1987) nationalism was the most important collectivity 
that promised a happy and healthy world protected from the forthcoming changes. 
The Yugoslav political elite had the greatest responsibility for paralyzing the country, 
the inability of the people to be constituted and the reduction of identity on ideology ( 
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Goat, 1981). After 1974, Yugoslavia was decentralized and special national system 
was created to organize various sectors, from education and culture to police and 
army. Perovic (1993) claims that the Yugoslav system was broken from the inside. In 
the public sphere, nationalism was aided by promoting anti-state concept, and the 
idea of a strong state emerged as an antipode to the socialist idea of the withering 
away of the state. The aim of socialism was the creation of the state as an instrument 
of class rule, the objective of nationalism was to create and/or strengthen the nation-
state. 
 Extensive semi-industrial and industrial production was the basis of capital 
accumulation. Primitive bureaucracy was strengthened, which was dependant on high 
external debt (Strpić, 1988). This type of development, agreements between the 
working class and bureaucracy in villages and cities, has become a founding feature 
of the society and the successor states of the 1980s and 1990s of the 20th century, 
which supported the rule of populist politicians. 
 Nationalism was an important factor, especially as the main alternative to 
socialism. Later on nationalism was a part of rhetoric that created the post-Yugoslav 
states. The approach advocated by nationalists ignores the fact that the violent 
nationalism could only succeed because the communist elite (starting with the 
ideology of the withering away of the country), weakened the country to the point 





5. SOCIO ECONOMIC EVENTS LEADING UP TO SEPARATION OF 
YUGOSLAVIA  
5.1 Underlying economic foundations: economic differences between republics                                                                                                                                                            
 The eighties in Yugoslavia developed without significant economic growth, 
despite the illusion that economic activity was in full force. This lead to unequal 
development throughout all republics, thereby creating a unbalanced system where 
the north (Slovenia, Croatia) was significantly more economically developed  than 
the southern republics (Macedonia, province of Kosovo). Neven Borak (2000) 
compared the levels of economic prosperity between republics with other nations, 
finding that “Yugoslavia was at the level of Turkey in terms of per capita gross 
domestic product at purchasing power parity in 1985. Kosovo, the less-developed 
part of Yugoslavia, was at the same  level as Pakistan. The most developed part, 
Slovenia, was compared with Spain and New Zealand. Vojvodina and Croatia 
approached Greece and Portugal. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were 
compared with Thailand and Mexico, and Serbia with Turkey". He showed that the 
former Yugoslavia was an economic federation with the biggest economic difference 
between republics in Europe.  
 Already sharp differences in living standards between republics were 
increasing as time passed. In 1986. the average salary in Slovenia was 40% above 
Yugoslav average, while in Macedonia the average salary was 30,6% under the 
Federal average. The earnings ratio between these two republics was 1:2 (Jovic, 
2003, p. 218).   
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 Figure 1 describes the GDP in republics and provinces between 1952 and 
1989, taking the Yugoslav average as index 100. From 1952, it is evident that 
Slovenia and Croatia were the most economically advanced republics, while Kosovo 
and Macedonia were the poorest. As we can conclude from the trends in Figure 1, 
there are upward trend in the portion of average Yugoslav GDP coming from 
Slovenia (+14), Vojvodina (+29) and Croatia (+5). Serbia as a whole did not change 
significantly, while there were decreases in Montenegro (-14), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (-18), Macedonia (-6), Kosovo (-19). This further highlights the 
disparities between the development of republics throughout the 40 year period. For 
example, the difference between most developed Republic Slovenia and the least 
developed Kosovo increased between 1952 1:3,9 till 1989 1.7,9 (Jovic, 2003, p. 219). 
Yugoslavia was unable to attain its goal of "brotherhood and unity", it's main political 
mission. Instead, the social and economic differences between republics were 
widening as time passed.  
 Another important impact along with the productivity levels and investment 
was the unbalanced morality rate, particularly between the north and south. That is in 
Kosovo, there was dynamic expansion of population between 1945 and 1990 by more 
than 20%, while there were less demographic changes in Vojvodina (-1.6%), Croatia 
(0,5), Serbia without provinces (1,4) and Slovenia (2,5). This lead to further 
economic tensions as developed republics were not comfortable with financing the 
less developed (and less educated) areas of the country without seeing their own 
benefit (Petak, 2003, p. 66).  
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 These differences had increased drastically since the self-management 
concept was established. Yugoslavia, as a socialist country, had a goal to decrease 
and not increase differences between developed and less-developed regions. Instead, 
the result was an even wider gap between regions. Throughout all republics, there 
was a sense of injustice. This was not just the case in Slovenia, who improved their 
position related to the Yugoslav average, but also in Kosovo, whose position 
worsened. Significant economic differences all lead to a common feeling of 
inequality across all republics/regions in Yugoslavia. They started to look at 
Yugoslavia as a country that has failed its own mission (Jovic, 2003, p. 212-218). 
 Given these differences in earnings and living standards across republics, 
the question remains: "how could this system function as a united market the way it 
did, with such evident disparities and inequality, without having a centralized fiscal 
authority?".  
 It was set by the 1974 constitution that the army, agriculture and retirement 
funds be subordinated under the federal authorities. Meanwhile, the republics were 
left to self-management of remaining social welfare programs (salaries, jobs, 
medicare, etc.). The economic structure was managed at the local republic level, 
thereby resulting in republic oriented decision making, as opposed to what was best 
for Yugoslavia as a whole. It was the most decentralized federation in Europe, the 
closest to that model being Switzerland. According to Petak (2003), the fundamental 
reasons were related to the political and economic system which lead to 
reinforcement of economic nationalism between countries.  
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5.2 Socialist unemployment  
 Unemployment had existed in Yugoslavia even since Second World War, 
but did not present a destructive element of the economic system in the country until 
the beginning of 80’s. After Tito's death, unemployment became main economic and 
political issue for Yugoslavia.  
 Table 1 describes that Yugoslavia as a socialist country was facing very 
high and rapidly increasing unemployment rate from 1984. A few years after Tito's 
death, unemployment was over 14% at the federal level. In the first year after German 
reunification in 1990, the Kosovo unemployment rate was over 50%. Branko Horvard 
(1985) claimed that if Yugoslavia faced an "African unemployment rate"1 the system 
would breakdown. It would have been impossible to have normal life if 
unemployment rate in some parts of Yugoslavia was over 50%.2 
 This makes one question why unemployed people from Kosovo, Macedonia 
and other less developed parts of Yugoslavia did not emigrate to Slovenia, where the 
unemployment rate was around 3%? (Table 1). 
 Why did not the market workforce mechanism work, as it did in other 
developed European countries? Although there was no law that forbade employment 
of people from less develop regions in the more developed republics, such as 
Slovenia, there was a very small percentage of people that was able to find a job 
there.  This question was raised by a lot of scholars from the United States and 
Western Europe. Still, labor markets at that time were already functioning as national 
                                                          
1 Branko Horvard used the term "African unemployment" to explain the situation when unemployment rate is 
above 50 % 
2 In Kosovo unemployment rate in 1985 was 54.2 % which increased to 57.8 % by 1998 
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markets. In the late 70’s, before Tito’s death, the mobility of people was already low. 
Commodity trade was functioning through the whole Yugoslavia, but labor market at 
that time was closed in Slovenia and partly in Croatia.  Labor movement functioned 
within ethnic communities. The search for a better job and higher living standards 
was related to the economic conditions within the given republic (Petak, 2003). That 
said, other key factors included the differences in cultural perspectives and traditions 
related to family planning as well as other psychological factors- namely, stemming 
from the desire to be in the majority. Similarly, there was great opposition and even 
fear of being in a minority in a given region (Vojnić, 1995, p. 93). 
 Primarily in Slovenia, economic inequality caused economic protectionism 
and further isolation of developed republics. As a result of the economic crisis and 
"self-management" ideology, Slovenia's labor market was becoming less available for 
"southern people" (Bosnians). The same happened to Albanians from Kosovo not just 
in Slovenia and Serbia, but across all republics. In times of crisis and limited 
resources, "southern people" became foreigners. Economic differences between 
nations now became cultural, social and political. Slovenia reinforced identification 
of "otherness", that they do not belong in their society. It seemed that Federation 
failed to prevent not just economic, but national political equality. Opinion that more 
could be done as separate republics, without Yugoslavia, was growing. Slovenians 
felt that everything will be better if borders were closed. On the other hand, 
Albanians were feeling huge gap in inequality and injustice between them and other 
Yugoslav people (Jovic, 2003, p. 220).                                                                                                                                         
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5.3. The Yugoslav fiscal system and institutional ineffectiveness 
 The main economic issues that Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
related to the vastly different standards of living across republics. Therefore, the key 
challenge the government faced was to reduce the high differences in GDP and 
unemployment between republics. The federal institutions that were dealing with 
these issues, namely the Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the 
Underdeveloped Republics and the province of Kosovo3 was involved in the planning 
of the Federal budget, but were unable to successfully reduce the gaps and raise 
living standards in the underdeveloped areas. 
 Table 2 considers the period after the Second World War, showing the 
centralization of the Yugoslav fiscal system. The federal authority handled slightly 
less than two thirds of the available funds. Similarly, federal units (republics) 
controlled approximately one quarter of the available funds. The remaining funds 
were allocated to local governments. This division of funds was slightly changed 
after economic reforms in 1965 were carried out. During that period, the federation 
remained in control of half of the available funds, but there was a significant increase 
in the amount attributed to local governments (increasing from twelve to thirty 
percent). The turning point in fiscal policy was the change of the Yugoslav 
constitution in 1974. This resulted in giving high priority to republics and local 
governments (Bogoev, 1991, pp. 100-102). The change lead to the adoption of a new 
                                                          
3 The Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and the province of Kosovo 
was established in 1965 as a inter-republic system of resources towards undeveloped regions in Yugoslavia.  
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system of social welfare, which was transferred to republics, leading to significant 
decentralization of public finances (see Figure 3.). This meant that the greatest 
control of wealth was in the hands of republics, which could allocate the funds as 
they saw necessary. As seen in the figure, in 1982, there was a very sharp decrease in 
funds at the federative level, amounting to slightly above twenty percent. 
 By decentralizing fiscal jurisdiction, the federal budget was limited to 
financing the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), financing undeveloped parts of the 
country, diplomacy and federal administration, pensions for war veterans and for 
agricultural policies. All other functions were taken over by republics and were dealt 
with in line with the decisions made by the republic. This structure was the source of 
more and more frustration between the western republics and the JNA, due to the 
direct financing of all military costs which was introduced by the Yugoslav 
Constitution in 1974. Additional problems related to fiscal affairs resulted from 
inefficiency in the use of funds that were allocated for the development of 
underdeveloped regions in the country. Regardless of the need for inter-republic 
funding to reduce the standard of living between the north and the south (Begić, 
1989), the fact remained that the level of investment in these regions was higher than 
in the developed parts but with higher capital coefficients than the Yugoslav average. 
A significant portion of invested capital, approximately two percent of the GDP was 
managed using the Federal Fund for Accelerated Development of the 
Underdeveloped Republics and the province of Kosovo. This method of collecting 
money was always question of complains. The underdeveloped regions continued to 
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ask for more and more funds (Macedonians, Bosnians, Montenegrins and Kosovars), 
while the developed regions (Slovenia and Croatia) were complaining that they are 
paying too much and that is not giving proper result (Sörensen, 2009, p. 101). This, 
along with the financing of the military, resulted in constant stress and conflict within 
the federalist system of Yugoslavia (Petak, 2003, p. 65). 
 In the beginning of the eighties, when a deep economic crisis hit Yugoslavia, 
the country faced severe internal and external shocks. Economic reforms were 
imperative. Due to the death of Tito, there was no political leader that would be able 
to enforce the policy of economic stabilization. In Tito's absence, Yugoslavia's 
federal center lacked sufficient authority to assert control over the country's economy 
and to successfully reform it. Due to the lack of sufficient economic reforms, the 
country found itself bankrupt to the degree that it would not permit even the media to 
discuss the growing wave of debt related questions. In order to stimulate investments 
and increase productivity, republic governments decreased taxes on firms and profit, 
as it was suggested by international creditors IMF, WB, EEC (Petak, 2003). 
 In response to the severe economic crisis, new institutional arrangements had 
started to develop. This trend of republics taking full control of the economic and 
fiscal policies could be classified as “economic nationalism”- a distinctive category 
from the more commonly used term of “ethnic nationalism (Petak, 2003). Economic 
nationalism was increasing with rejection of north-western units to cover expenses 
and production losses on federal level, furthermore isolating from Yugoslav market 
and turning towards the European market. Since the Yugoslav Communist Party was 
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not able to deal with high level of unemployment, republics started building up new 
institutional agreements within their territories, particularly Slovenia and Croatia. 
"The new institutional structures include highly various actors at the level of 
republics: officials in executive bodies, parliamentary members, economic chambers 
members and in the Slovenian case even the members of various non-governmental 
organizations (Petak, 2003, p. 6)".  Institutional agreements built on federal units 
level in order to deal with the socialist unemployment Woodward called the 
“Slovenian model” and the “ Foca model” (Woodward 1995, pp. 264-65). According 
to Woodward "The Slovenian model" had more liberal approach to economic growth 
within the socialist economy, focusing on market competition and world-market 
standards of productivity. This way, employment would react to market demand, 
thereby demonstrating the advantage of flexibility (Woodward, 1995, p. 264-265). 
The second model represented a more state approach to the economic development, 
with high involvement of political structures in the production processes. Both 
models are branches of socialist self-management framework, derived from and 
adapted to different regional conditions within the unevenly developed Yugoslavia 
(Sörensen, 2009, p. 100). 
 The loss of legitimacy of the federal Communist Party was reflected on the 
international scene. In addition, northwestern republics engaged in more economic 
activity with Western European countries. Similarly, the developed federal units did 
not want to sponsor federal army, undeveloped regions and federal administration. 
All these events changed the political orientation of northwestern republics Croatia 
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and Slovenia towards the West. As Susan Woodward pointing out in her book: 
“While the decline of the federal party’s international bargaining position gave the 
republican parties illusion of more freedom to go their own way, that freedom would 
also depend on international leverage. It was not the republics in the south with 
unemployment of 20 percent or more that took political lead, but Slovenia – with full 
employment, labor shortages in industry, and only recent threats to living standards. 
Full employment in Slovenia meant that the costs of liberalization and technological 
modernization were much lower… Although an export-oriented, marketizing reform 
government objected strongly to its loss of rights to retain these revenues in Slovenia 
implied by the new requirements for depositing foreign exchange with the National 
Bank. Without that foreign exchange, Slovenia’s program to raise workers 
productivity back to European standards and to resolve labor shortages to industry 
with imports of more-advanced equipments and technology was in danger. In view of 
declining standards of living in the republic and wage competition with foreign 
countries for professional labor, its enterprises began to campaign against the rules on 
redistribution of a portion of market earnings from ‘above-average’ to ‘below-
average’ firms and localities to replenish solidarity funds for guaranteed wages and 
the federal fund for credits to less developed republics. In their view, this 
redistribution was weakening the incentives to higher productivity in Slovene firms. 
Objecting to federal taxation on similar grounds – that resources were being wasted 
on the less efficient or unproductive – the republican government began to protest 
against the visible beneficiaries of the federal budget: the federal army, the less 
developed republics, and the federal administration (Woodward, 1995, p. 355-356)". 
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 After the decentralization, the next requirement for the adoption of "The 
Slovene model" was the rejection of socialist federal institutions and the development 
of new, individual, institutional arrangements to deal with the bankruptcy of the 
socialist model and the growing unemployment rate. This orientation towards the 
development of individual institutions was coined "economic nationalism". The 
Slovenes aimed to liberate the economy, opening towards new markets and aiming to 
raise productivity to European standards. Given that the Yugoslav was very labor 
intensive, as opposed to capital intensive, increased productivity could be achieved 
with the same level of technology and an increase in the number of employees, or by 
keeping the number of employees the same but purchasing new technology in the 
form of machinery which would allow for more competition with European 
counterparts. The Slovenes were very set on purchasing new technology, as they were 
not willing to integrate minorities from other republics.  
 The "Foca model" was propagated on behalf of the Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA), whose funding would have been additionally affected by the implementation 
of the Slovene model. Similarly, the JNA was unwilling to reduce costs of operations 
and continued to spend public funds for personnel and equipment. The reasoning 
behind this continued spending and purchases of new weapons was done "in 
accordance with its own strategy that after dissolution of the Warsaw pact, the threat 
from NATO still continued to exist (Petak, 2003)." 
 The main political conflict in Yugoslavia was between the federal army 
(defender of socialism) and the northwestern republics (promoters of economic 
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freedoms). As a result of this misalignment in economic and fiscal policy, economic 
nationalism grew, brewing tensions among republics. This significantly impacted 
relations and the road to separation of Yugoslavia was paved. 
 According to Gligorov (1990), federalism was not affirmed in Yugoslavia 
even though socialism was abandoned. The reason for the lack of success in affirming 
federalism was because Yugoslavia was primarily established on two conflicting 
principles-socialism and federalism. Socialism had an aim to centralize political 
structures and make them authoritarian, while federalism is based on liberty and 
autonomy. Socialism left bankrupt economy and the institutional arrangements 
evolved out as a respond  to that problem were not connected with the affirmation of 
federalism. Contrary, they were connected with economic nationalism, because 
constituent nations were reluctant to bear the other nation’s costs of socialist 
bankruptcy (Petek, 2003). 
 At one side in the upcoming conflict were Slovenia and Croatia, proponents 
of “The Slovene model” and at the other were JNA, Serbia and Montenegro, 
proponents of “The Foca model”. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well Macedonia, were 
located between the two poles. The only thing for which it should be waiting for was 
a motive to start with military conflict. It was found in Declarations of independence 
proclaimed by Slovenian and Croatian parliaments in June 1991. One day after JNA 




6. THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL GRIDLOCK 
 6.1. Triggers of the Yugoslav economic crisis 
 The oil crises in 1973 and 1979 had a significant impact on the Yugoslav 
economy. Namely, in 1973, the OAPEC (Arab members of OPEC4 including Egypt 
and Syria) proclaimed an oil embargo.5 This resulted in a quadrupling of oil prices 
from three dollars per barrel at the start of the embargo to twelve dollars per barrel at 
the end of the embargo in March, 1974. Yugoslavia was also affected, both politically 
and economically, in the short run and long run by this unfolding of events. Namely, 
the rapid increases in prices lead to the inability of developing countries on the 
euro/dollar market to continue the financing, thereby ending up in debt. The countries 
weak economic foundations were exposed due to the significant rise in oil prices. As 
a result, the trade balance deteriorated significantly.  
 Yugoslavia ignored the suggestions from the International Monetary Fund, 
which proposed limiting domestic consumption and introducing austerity measures, 
and instead borrowed heavily from the World bank. This lead to even further 
economic stress as Yugoslavia's foreign debt skyrocketed from $3.5 billion in 1973 to 
$20.5 billion in 1981 (Woodward, 1995, p. 76). Poor economic foundations partnered 
with global instability and the death of Tito in June, 1980, resulted in a very 
unpredictable situation for the country. Due to this uncertainty, the Yugoslav dinar 
                                                          
4 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries consists 13 members. It was formed as a respond to 
multinational companies "Seven sisters" who were dominated international oil market 
5 Embargo was proclaimed as a respond to United States and Western Europe support to Israel in the Yom Kippur 
War of 1973. 
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was significantly weakened compared to dollar, currency reserves were exhausted, 
foreign exchange market activities were stopped and lending costs grew higher. This 
left Yugoslavia with high debt, an unreformed economic model, political instability 
and uncertainty. Coupled with poor investment decisions, lack of structural reforms, 
external political instability due to the various changes on the global political scene 
(wars in the gulf states, USSR in Afghanistan, etc.), the Yugoslav economic climate 
was certainly in significant decline (Vuković, 2012). These were the founding blocks 
to the eventual rise of nationalism throughout the country, which will be discussed 
further throughout this paper. 
6. 2 Political reactions to the crisis and increase of nationalism 
 When a deep economic crisis hit the country, the political institutions were 
under stress. The 1974 constitution made Tito president for life, but since his death 
there was no recognized political leader who could step up and take the country out 
of crisis. As defined by the constitution, in the case of Tito's death, a rotating 
presidency would take effect. That was a new phase for state of affairs in Yugoslavia. 
The country experienced something for the first time, which had never before 
happened in a communist state. The country was left without a leader, and instead a 
new governance model involving representatives for each republic was introduced. 
This lead to difficulties as each republic representative would focus primarily on their 
republic's concerns, rather than focus on Yugoslavia as a whole (Bianchini, 2012, p. 
2). The new rotation presidency consisted eight members who were representing six 
republics and two provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Members of the presidency 
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were appointed by republics and provinces, and the date of the rotation for 
chairmanship takes over the position are set  by alphabetic order and balanced ethnic 
ratio. Essential economic matters (such as defense and foreign affair) continued to be 
in federation responsibility, which required a consensus among federal units. The 
most important change that the constitution 1974 brought was giving the federal 
units, including two provinces, right to block any decision by veto.  This was set in 
order to prevent any nationality from gaining too much power and to ensure that no 
nationality felt excluded. (Spencer, M. 1998) . "It was clear from the beginning that 
"Yugoslav synthesis" would have been produce by ability of negotiating and 
mediating the deferent interests expressed by its territorial administrations" 
(Bianchini, 2012,  p.2).  In this part of the paper we will be focusing on political 
reaction to the crisis.  
 The harsh economic climate resulted in an increase in national tensions 
between republics due to the declining GDP (Labus, 1994, p. 232). Given that 
Yugoslavia was  already decentralized at the time, political conflict due to the 
distribution of funds between republics and respective communist parties was a major 
concern and a cause of significant disagreement. In 1982, the actual magnitude of the 
debt crisis came to the forefront, proving that all involved republics and autonomous 
provinces were irresponsibly spending public funds, without notifying the federal 
government. It is estimated that their careless spending was sixty-five percent of the 
country's debt (Benett, 1997, pp. 69-70). This was possible due to the 1974 
constitution, which established institutional framework thereby allowing the 
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formation of national economies governed and managed at the republic levels.  
Uncontrolled borrowing, unknown to the federal authorities, had became an endemic. 
Everybody was borrowing hoping that someone else would foot the bill.   
 The heavy borrowing in 1970 was not invested wisely, further contributing to 
the economic turmoil felt in the 1980s. The Prime Minister, Branko Mikulic (1986), 
stated that more than fifty percent of the borrowed funds were used for poorly 
planned projects, with little or no long term economic benefit. The wealthy republics- 
Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina and Serbia were funding the development of less 
developed regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo. 
This economic policy was a failure as the income gap and standard of living between 
the wealthy and poor republics/regions was only increasing. As mentioned earlier in 
the text, this is further highlighted by comparing the per capital income in Slovenia, 
the wealthiest republic, was about three times that of Kosovo, the poorest unit, in 
1945 but six times as great by 1980s. "At the same time, Yugoslavia's universities 
began churning out graduates in the backward republics. While their level of 
education lead to high expectations, these were expectations which could never be 
fulfilled in a shrinking jobs market. It was a long-term recipe for disaster (Woodward, 
1995, p. 69)."  
 The 1982 government, lead by Milka Planinic, was put under immense 
pressure from the side of the International Monetary Fund which resulted in the 
adoption of an anti-inflationary stabilization program of  restrictive measures, with 
trade and price liberalization. Furthermore, the IMF demanded that Yugoslavia's 
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central government take control of the federal budget and to develop mechanisms 
which would enable easier decision making and implementation of economic 
policies. They suggested the use of majority voting, thereby eliminating the veto 
system (Spencer, 1998). The requirement was opposed by republican politicians from 
developed areas that benefited from the decentralization. Their main argument was in 
favored of democracy, but in fact they had privileges to protect. By opposing reform, 
they proved to be nationalistic because they were defending the interests of their own 
republics (Bannet, 1997, pp. 69-70). 
 Ironically, Slovenia and Croatia were against the institutional elements of 
reform. They fully supported the veto system and were against majority rule. They 
were not in favor of the proposed changes put forward by the international 
community, believing that the veto would enable them to protect their own national 
interests more effectively. Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and 
Kosovo rejected majority rule, afraid that adopting it would result in a loss of control 
of local assets. This resulted in the further prolonging of the political gridlock 
(Woodward, 1995, p.62). 
 Economic protectionism of federal units began to grow, resulting in increased 
tensions between republics and thereby affecting the unity of Yugoslav market. 
Conflicts between national economies and  national federal units were more and more 
frequent. In the meantime, the economic crisis was having a crumbling effect on the 
entire country (high unemployment rate, enormous foreign debt, high expenses in 
unproductive investments, large administration and a very expensive bureaucratic 
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system. Given that the existing economic system was insufficient to solve the issues 
posed by the economic crisis, urgent economic reforms were needed.   
In 1982, the first commission, called the "Sergej Kraigher Commission", was 
established in order to explore conditions under which economic reform would be 
possible.  It was decided that the total amount of the country's debt would be made 
public, but the split by republic was not publicized in order to prevent a deeper 
economic crisis and the triggering of a chain reaction from protectionism to 
nationalism (Bianchini, 2011, p. 2). 
 The new formulation of this economic model, better known as ”the long term 
program for economic stabilization", was approved by federal parliament. 
Unfortunately, these measures were not enforced and properly seen through. The 
many opponents were in favor of a status quo position with regards to state regulation 
in the economic system due to the interests of their respective republics. Similarly, 
they believed that the proposed economic reforms would be risky and that they would 
not be able to be sustainable in the Yugoslav political structure. Too much risk was 
involved and republics believed they would be at the losing end, losing their political 
leverage with regards to participation in drafting economic policy.  
 The second established commission was called the Josip Vrhovec 
Commission, whose main focus was the political system. It was founded in 1984, 
working for two years, with the main goal of modifying the political system in a way 
that would positive impact the economic climate, thereby uncluttering the gridlock 
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and facilitating more expedative reforms to deal with the mounting stress of the 
economic crisis. Instead, they opposed the suggestions proposed by the economic 
commission for being against "true socialist self-management" (Crnobrnja, 1996, pp. 
86-87).  
 The 1974 constitution dictated that parliamentary deputies would be elected 
by lower-level delegations instead of the citizens of Yugoslavia. That is, the citizens 
would elect these lower-level delegates that would later select parliamentary deputies. 
The deputies need to follow the instructions of the delegations and if they opposed to 
do so, they would be removed from their position (Dimitrijevic, 1994, p. 55). The 
commission did not deal with the imperative democratization of the political 
structure. It instead avoided the discussion of free multi-party elections. As a result, 
the positive steps taken had been blocked. 
 Attempts to get both economic and political reforms into action lasted for four 
years (from 1982-1984), however they did not give any positive result. Developed 
republics turned  their political orientation towards West and others kept the status 
quo in terms of production, services, employment which was costly and ineffective 
with respect to the economic needs of Yugoslavia (Crnobrnja. 1996). 
 In sum, without democratic reforms that politicians were considering to be 
against socialist ideology, it was evident that they were working in favor and interest 
of their republics, as opposed to the benefit of the country as a whole. In that regards, 
the bridge between protectionism and nationalism becomes evident. As a result, 
instead of  facilitating  the internal negotiation of interests and developing common 
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goals at the federative level, republics began to distance themselves (Bianchini, 2011, 
p.3).  
 As mentioned earlier, the constitution was composed in a way that allowed 
the republics a significant amount of local leadership, however it also resulted in 
significant gridlock in the political system due to the veto power of the republics and 
provinces. Therefore, it could be said that the constitution set the foundation for 
mistrust, as it was giving republics and provinces the possibility to sponsor projects in 
their own interest, funded by federal funds. The reckless spending was not justified 
and certainly was not benefiting the majority. The constitution was based on 
consensuses, which is not in line with federal agreements. The combination of lack of 
trust and veto power resulted in the prevention of implementing any sort of 
significant reforms which would positively impact the country in recovering from the 
economic crisis. As Crnobrnja wrote, the Josip Vrhovec Commission opened 
Pandora's box of national change, instead of developing a democratic process, where 
the citizens had a greater role.  "Rather blaming systematic causes for pure economic 
performance, because that would have involved self-criticism as well, the popular 
line became that others were to blame (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 87)". 
 The idea of brotherhood and sense of a collective within the federation was 
quickly eroding, thereby reducing the ability to raise funds for investments 
(Bianchini. 2012. p. 3). The more developed republics, Slovenia and Croatia, 
complained about the aid they were contributing toward less-developed republics, 
thereby draining them of resources. On the other hand, the less developed republics 
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reciprocated by complaining about the terms of trade, which favored the developed 
regions. These republics argued that the developed republics gained more from the 
trade than they give from investment (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 88). 
 The redistribution mechanism supporting the less developed republics was 
being more and more underfunded due to the political situation and growing requests 
from economically disadvantaged areas in the country (Bianchini, 2012, p. 3). 
 By the end of 1986, republics disagreed with the required contributions to the 
federal government. They stopped paying their share of the federal budget and gained 
fiscal sovereignty. The Serbian government was still in favour of stronger federal 
government, however both Kosovo and Vojvodina prevented internal economic 
reforms. Affluent Slovenia, on the other side of the spectrum, opposed economic 
reforms because it was faring well, even if Yugoslavia was not. There was less risk if 
the central government collapsed because Slovenia would fare well on its own 
(Spencer, 1998). 
 As Mihajilo Crnobrnja (1996) pointed out "this debate of a shrinking cake was 
not a central issue of a growing confrontation. The reader might find this surpassingly 
but if one keeps in mind that the object of the exercise was not to modernize the 
country but to readjust the system in a way that would ensure the bureaucracy's hold 
on power. In such a situation it was always easier and politically more expedient to 
look for blame elsewhere, to change other for economic suffering (Crnobrnja, 1996)." 
The economic and political relationships in Yugoslavia affected the system of self-
management. Bianchini (2011) also pointed out that bureaucracy played a big role, 
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which prevented investments from one republic into another. In reality, the system 
was created in a way to prevent "domestic colonial relations" where on republic was 
effectively colonizing another. This lead to a delayed decision making process, 
affecting economic effectiveness and market powers. The final result was the 
reinvestment of capital in local republics, further supporting the flourishing living 
standards, instead of developing underdeveloped areas. Local investments were given 
a priority. This trend became even more evident when tensions between republics 
increased. There was a significant decrease in economic activity resulting from the 
reduction of distribution of goods and increase of social inequalities. Social inequality 
grew, as did the gap between developed and undeveloped areas, all support raise in 
nationalism throughout the republics (Bianchini, 2011). 
 Economic crisis and institutional ineffectiveness resulted in putting the blame 
in other republics hands for declining standard of living. In the first place, the 
Slovenian elite blamed Serbia and the federal government for redistribution of 
resources (jointly decided in Belgrade) to undeveloped regions. Furthermore, Serbian 
Academy of Intellectuals criticised the economic and cultural discrimination of Serbs 
living in republics outside of Serbia. Political elites engaged in conflict over the 
future of Yugoslavia and disagreed on whether it would take form of federation or 
confederation. In the process, the elites mobilized local citizens from their respective 
regions, which brought up the political conflict to a larger scale and on ethnic basis 
(Goati, 1996). The critical role was played by the Serb’s leader, Slobodan Milosevic 
who mobilized Serbs against the leadership of Vojvodina, Kosovo and Slovenia. The 
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means to fight the respective leadership was through mass demonstrations (the so 
called "people's event"). Consequently, the political tensions led to social and 
economic crisis with forceful self-victimization and creation of nationalism against 
the "otherness" (Bianchini, 2011). 
 The socio-economic and political crisis led to the deadlock decision-making 
system. Changing constitutional system was perceived as the only way forward, even 
if it had to be delivered on forcefully. The situation created polarization of the whole 
Yugoslavia, which left no space for mediation. Nationalism was mainstreamed as the 
central ideology that deepened the already existing lack of trust and spoiled relations 
among republics and regions. The self-interest and preservation of power by political 
leaders was reinforced, through protecting their territorial autonomy. Unavoidably, 
disintegration process began and countries started demanding independence. 
 The rise in nationalism was a result of an ever deep economic crisis in the 
Yugoslavia. The sharp decrease in living standards and instability throughout all 
levels of society lead to the rebuilding of republics, thereby weakening the federal 
construction that was Yugoslavia. “The 1980s resulted in a loss of legitimacy of the 
political elite, as their tendencies to ethicized all social conflicts became more and 
more evident (Schierup, 1991, p. 122. similarly Goati 1996). Instead of a conflict 
between the governing communist parties with society, as was the case in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and DRN, the Yugoslav paradigm was different. There was a conflict 
between parts of the governing communist party which had strong support in certain 
parts of society. The conflicting position between western republics that were in 
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support of a transition towards a European model and the remaining republics that 
were in support of a communist regime, was a cause of much strain within the 
country (Goati, 1996). The next section will further examine the split within the 
communist party.  
6.3. Political elite and the split within Communist party 
 The self-management system in Yugoslavia did not enable all republics to 
develop at the same pace, the northwestern republics benefiting from it, while the 
southern republics were not. The political framework was founded on a one party 
political system, while the economic system was based on the motivation of the 
working class. In order for this system to function, a mechanism for conflict 
management must have existed. The economic system based on social cohesion and 
self-management allowed the communist party to set the rules of the game and to be 
the supervisor in its management (Labus, 1994, pp. 226-227).  
 As previously mentioned, the federal assembly representatives were not 
directly elected. Instead, the citizens would elect local political leaders, who would 
then elect representatives at the federal level. These federal representatives would 
need to carry out the requests of the local officials; otherwise, they would have been 
removed from the position.  In the founding acts of the 1974 constitution, the 
communist party of Yugoslavia was described as “the founding initiator and carrier of 
the political and economic system" (Hayden, 2011). This is a paradox as the 
communist party which held all power, was not composed of elected officials, but 
appointed ones. This was the only formulation in the constitution, which was 
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dependent on the unending establishment of communist rule in Yugoslavia. Nobody 
had predicted and prepared for the end of such political governance (through the 
communist party) at the time of approval, as was the case in January 1990 (Hayden, 
2011). Therefore, the split of the communist party, which held complete political and 
economic control over the federation, lead to the eventual collapse of Yugoslavia. 
 Discussing the changes in the political system enabled the communist leaders 
in republics and autonomous republics to adopt political positions different than that 
of the party. After the death of Tito, it became more and more evident that politicians 
were basing their differences on ethnic belonging. Both political and social agendas 
were being based on national programs and the strengthening of republics. This 
resulted in two key conclusions. Firstly, it raised the question of ethnicity and the rise 
of nationalism across all republics. Secondly, it became a source of anger and 
frustration pointed toward the Yugoslav federation. Conflicts with federal units 
became evermore present and decision making became centered on republics as 
opposed to what would benefit Yugoslavia as a whole. The result was a weakening 
federal political system and the strengthening of republics. A loose coalition of six 
communist parties, each with their own agenda, lead to the political bankruptcy of an 
outdated political system. That said, the existence of the communist party of 
Yugoslavia was the only mechanism keeping the governance of the federation 
together. Over time, however, the weakening of the communist party resulted in six 
nationalistic segments of the party, eventually leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia 
(Crnobrnja, 1996, pp. 90-91). 
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 Between 1989 and 1991, it was evident that the elites of the six republics did 
not have an equal role. It was more and more evident that Serbia, Slovenia and 
Croatia were setting the grounds for what would happen to all the republics, with 
Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina feeling the after-effects. The 
formulation in the constitution with regards to all republics being equal, was just the 
situation on paper.  
 In socialism, the communist party is the only institutional lever leading to 
change in the economic system. Therefore, for things in the country to be better (i.e. 
recovery from the economic crisis and reduction of social misbalance), the Yugoslav 
communist party would need to reform itself. This task was simply impossible given 
the political and ethnic conflicts that were growing in frequency at the time (Labus. 
1994). The breakup of the Yugoslav communist party was achieved at the last 
congress in 1990, where it was split between the Slovenian and Serbian units. The 
end of the political and federal system was in sight (Goati, 1996). 
 Labus (1994) claims the main reason behind the conflict was not related to the 
federation-confederation framework, but most predominantly related to the need for 
institutional change. The Slovenian communists were aware that socialism failed and 
they were in favor of institution changes which would liberate Slovenia and allow it 
to pursue its path towards Western Europe. They had support from their Croatian 
counterparts who were aiming for the same goal. On the other hand, Serbian and 
Montenegrin communists wanted a stronger federation with less institutional 
responsibilities at the republic level. Taking advantage of rising nationalism, the 
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Serbian communist party rejected autonomous regions and suspended institutional 
changes (Labus, 1994). On March 28th, 1989 the Serbian constitution regarding the 
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina was amended. The leadership in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Macedonia were unable to find a balanced position with regards to 
the changing forces being felt in Slovenia and Croatia with those persistent in Serbia 
and Montenegro. There was political gridlock throughout the republics with 
uncertainty rising (Goati, 1996). 
 Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro supported the 
1990 Federal government in holding free federal parliamentary elections. On the 
other hand, Slovenia and Serbia opposed. In effect, this resulted in the weakening of 
the Yugoslav Federation. Instead of holding federal level elections, they were held at 
the level of republics, which thereby strengthened the internal positions and 
significantly harmed the unity at the federal level (Goati, 1996). As Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan concluded in discussing similar issues in Spain, it is of vital importance 
for elections to be held throughout the country at the same time, as opposed to 
holding them separately across regions. This allows for easier management of daily 
order, controls political figures and organizations, and most importantly the validity 
of the government. When free elections are held throughout the country at the same 
time, it is easier to face and overcome problems directly (Linz and Stepan, 1992, p. 
126). The elections were held three months after the last congress in 1990, which saw 
the split into two fractions (Slovenian and Serbian). The old communist elite held 
onto support from voters in Serbia and Montenegro. On the other hand, new political 
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elite received support in the other republics. That is, communist support remained in 
Serbia and Montenegro on one hand and nationalistic-liberal support was introduced 
in Slovenia and Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia were unsure about 
which political system they were in favor of, while the army remained faithful to the 
communist model (Woodward, 1995, p.12). 
 In January 1991, Markovic’s government proposed new constitution changes 
in order to adequately reform the system of governance and save the country. Both 
Slovenia and Serbia disagreed and no reforms were carried out. As Jacques Delors 
wrote “No integration can be successful without a true institutional dynamic”. This 
was the final chance to change the malfunctioning system from failure and no 
consensus was reached (Crnobrnja, 1996). 
 The role of mass media significantly impacted the support for rising 
nationalist opposition. It was often the case that nationalist leaders would make 
statements regarding the threats coming from other republics within Yugoslavia. 
They would claim that their lifestyle was being threatened, that there were significant 
differences between republics and that life together is only harming them further. The 
idea of Tito's "brotherhood and unity" was disappearing. The aim of mass media was 
a homogenize citizens within the republic and pit them against the other republics of 
Yugoslavia. Eventually, this change of mindset had resulted in acts of violence 
against citizens coming from outside the given republic (Goati, 1996). Andrija Kresic 
described this saying “the element of nationalism didn’t stem from the people. 
Pandora's box of nationalism was opened by the ruling political bodies and 
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nationalism would result in the uncountable loss of human life. The political 
intoxication of nationalism would be reported by the mass media, thereby 
brainwashing citizens and leading to ethnic clashes between all involved republics 
fueled by hate (Kresic, 1994, p. 79)". In that way, the conflict between republic elites 
regarding the future of “second Yugoslavia” was transformed into a multinational 
conflict.  
 Lack of political consensus and timely democratic reforms were the main 
reasons behind the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Politicians were focused on the 
interests of their republics, and concern for a common federation grew thinner and 
thinner. This lead to arguments focusing on differences as opposed to defining talking 
points that could lead to an improved situation for all citizens in all republics 
(Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 92). Lack of mutual trust and increasing suspicions lead to the 
dissolution between republics and regions, thereby resulting in a political atmosphere 
of protectionism, further fueled by nationalism and self-interest.  On one hand, the 
goal was to enter Europe immediately. On the other, it was for the Federation or 
nothing. Nobody was interested in finding common ground and compromise. The 
breakup of the communist party lead to the dissolution of the cohesive unit 
responsible for maintaining political rule. Similarly, the democratic system was not 
established at the time. This left the country’s institutions weakened, while the 




 Finally, nationalism in all republics with no political solutions in sight, 
coupled with social and economic differences across republics result in Serbia, 
Croatia and Slovenia realizing that the country must be broken apart. Unable to split 
the country fairly, war was the inevitable result of political incompetency from all 
sides to solve the crisis.   
7. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, we have examined the economic crisis and political framework 
which contributed to the rise of nationalism, leading to the eventual dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. We supported our argumentation by examining literature by Woodward, 
Bianchini, Petak, Crnobrnja, Labus, Goati, and other scholars described in the 
literature review. In order to establish the theoretical background for our study, we 
considered two main academic approaches to nationalism. The first is the modernist 
school (economic approach), which is centered around economic development. They 
believe that the nation is an imagined political community, where each ethnic group 
is part of a social period that cannot last forever. Furthermore, they find that the 
political elite is the creator of nationalism. The second is the primordialists school 
(ethnic approach), which is centered around the ethnic approach. They believe that 
historical experience is a form of attachment and deeply defines the characteristics of 
an ethnic group. They believe that the political elite is not the only reason behind the 
rise of nationalism. We found that the Yugoslav case reflected no fixed and long term 
ethnic groups, but rather that the identity of ethnic groups are linked to social 
changes. This is in line with the modernist approach mentioned above.  
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 Further considering the connection between democracy and nationalism, we 
have concluded that the leaders of the republics were not willing to reform the 
political system in favor of Yugoslavia, but rather kept the status quo that favored 
republics. They rejected suggestions by the international community in introducing 
majority voting, not willing to change the veto system as defined by the 1974 
Constitution. The mounting economic stress and political gridlock resulted in a 
stalemate position which lead to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
 We proved our three main hypotheses; namely, that socialist bankruptcy was a 
main trigger behind the eventual rise of nationalism; that the rise of nationalism stems 
from the economic crisis; and finally, that insufficient reforms by the political elite 
lead to the split within communist party, increasing nationalism. 
 We analyzed the impact of socialist bankruptcy and the effect on the rise of 
nationalism, proving that the primary goal of socialism - to provide equal 
opportunities to all citizens - was not achieved. This resulted in significant economic 
differences across republics, which kept growing instead of decreasing. Due to the 
factors of increased unemployment and significant economic differences, coupled 
with the impact of the oil crisis on the Yugoslav economy, republics started 
developing independent institutional arrangements. This lead to the federal fiscal 
crisis and unwillingness for cooperation among republics, further weakening the 
federation and strengthening the political elite at the republic level.    
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 When deep economic crisis started in early 80s, institution we put under 
stress. Instead of dealing with crisis, republican leaders were protecting interests of 
their own republics. The rise in nationalism was a result of an ever deep economic 
crisis in the Yugoslavia. The sharp decrease in living standards and instability 
throughout all levels of society lead to the rebuilding of republics, thereby weakening 
the federal construction that was Yugoslavia.  
 In addition, we find that the political framework set by the 1974 Constitution 
set the grounds for significant institutional governance changes. Namely, after the 
death of Tito, leaders of each republic all had a right of vote in the decision making 
process, each having veto power. No decision could be passed without agreement 
from all sides. We conclude that this resulted in political gridlock and was a source of 
significant tension. Despite the advice from the international community and the 
suggestion to adopt a majority rule system, these key reforms were rejected. Some 
republics maintained their belief in the communist system, while some changed their 
orientation towards the West. We argue that the political elite acted in their self 
interest due to unaligned ideologies and the adoption of a decentralized system which 
gave them significant powers over local assets. The future of Yugoslavia took second 
place to that of the individual republics. As a result, we conclude that the failure of 
institutions lead to a "institutional vacuum" which was quickly filled by nationalistic 
leaders. This lead to the reinforcement of ethnic nationalism and further to 
protectionist economic decisions.  
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 Finally, we conclude that the communist party was the only institutional lever 
able to initiate real change in the economic and political system. Therefore, for things 
in the country to be better (i.e. recovery from the economic crisis and reduction of 
social misbalance), the Yugoslav communist party would need to reform itself. We 
find that this task was simply impossible given the political and ethnic conflicts that 
were growing in frequency at the time. The party had support in certain regions 
throughout the country, but not enough to enable significant reforms. The political 
elite had known only for collective ideology. Instead of a conflict between the 
governing communist parties with society, there was a conflict within different 
segments of the communist party, only some of which had support from the people. 
Discussing the changes in the political system enabled the communist leaders in 
republics and autonomous republics to adopt political positions different than that of 
the party. After the death of Tito, it became more and more evident that politicians 
were basing their differences on ethnic belonging. Both political and social agendas 
were being based on national programs and the strengthening of republics. We 
believe that the result of these actions raised the question of ethnicity and therefore 
lead to the rise of nationalism across all republics. We conclude that with the breakup 
of the communist party, there was no political cohesive unit in Yugoslavia and, due to 
the lack of political will, there was no democratic system established either. This left 
the country’s institutions weakened, while the growing strength of the republics could 
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Map 1: Map of SFRY before the war 1990. 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 





Figure 1. - Structure of GDP in republics and provinces 1952-1989 
(index 100 - Yugoslav average) 
 
 




























Table 1 - Unemployment rate in Yugoslav federal units 
Years 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Yugoslavia 13.8 13.8 14.4 14.9 15.7 16.3 16.6 16.1 16.8 14.9 15.9 
Developed regions 
Slovenia 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.5 3.2 4.8 
Croatia 5.7 6.1 6.9 7.4 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.8 8.5 8.0 8.6 
Serbia 18.9 17.7 17.9 17.3 17.0 17.4 17.9 17.8 18.1 15.6 16.4 




16.6 16.7 17.9 20.3 23.0 24.4 24.3 23.1 24.1 20.3 20.6 
Montenegro 17.5 18.1 19.3 21.6 23.5 24.6 25.6 23.6 26.3 21.6 21.6 
Macedonia 27.9 29.0 28.1 26.4 26.7 27.6 27.7 27.3 27.1 21.9 22.9 
Kosovo 39.0 39.1 41.0 44.5 49.9 54.2 57.1 57.0 57.8 36.3 38.4 








Table 2 - Portion of total public expenditure based on level of government, 
1947 - 1986 in Yugoslavia 
 1947/1951 1954/1959 1968/1970 1982 1984 1986 
Federation 63.1 56.3 53.1 18.2 19.7 21.9 
Federal units 24.3 14.2 18.3 40.3 39.5 38.7 
Local 
government 
12.6 29.5 26.6 38.3 37.4 37.2 
Unlisted - - - 3.2 3.4 2.2 
Source: Bogoev, 1991. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
